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Frases de Robert Axelrod

Robert Marshall Axelrod é um cientista político estadunidense. Ele é professor de ciência política e políticas públicas na Universidade de Michigan, onde trabalha desde 1974. Axelrod é conhecido por seu trabalho interdisciplinar sobre a evolução da cooperação, que é frequentemente citado em artigos. Seus temas atuais de pesquisa incluem a teoria da complexidade , segurança internacional e segurança cibernética. Axelrod é membro do Council on Foreign Relations. Wikipedia  

✵ 27. Maio 1943
Robert Axelrod: 15   citações 0   Curtidas

Robert Axelrod: Frases em inglês

“The theory of evolution is based on the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest. Yet cooperation is common between members of the same species and even between members of different species.”

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Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Axelrod, Robert, and William Donald Hamilton. "The evolution of cooperation." Science 211.4489 (1981): 1390

“Aggregation means the organization of elements of a system into patterns that tend to put highly compatible elements together and less compatible elements apart. Landscape theory predicts how aggregation will lead to alignments among actors (such as nations), whose leaders are myopic in their assessments and incremental in their actions. The predicted configurations are based upon the attempts of actors to minimize their frustration based upon their pairwise propensities to align with some actors and oppose others. These attempts lead to a local minimum in the energy landscape of the entire system. The theory is supported by the results of the alignment of seventeen European nations in the Second World War. The theory has potential for application to coalitions of business firms, political parties in parliaments, social networks, social cleavages in democracies, and organizational structures.”

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Robert Axelrod livro The Complexity of Cooperation

Chap. 4 : Choosing Sides
Adapted from Robert Axelrod and D. Scott Bennett “A Landscape Theory of Aggregation,” British Journal of Political Science 23 (Apr. 1993): 211–33.
The Complexity of Cooperation (1997)

“In complex environments, individuals are not fully able to analyze the situation and calculate their optimal strategy. Instead they can be expected to adapt their strategy over time based upon what has been effective and what has not.”

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Robert Axelrod livro The Complexity of Cooperation

Chap. 1 : Evolving New Strategies

Adapted from Robert Axelrod, “The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma,” in Genetic Algorithms and Simulated Annealing, ed. Lawrence Davis (London: Pitman; Los Altos, Calif.: Morgan Kaufman, 1987)
The Complexity of Cooperation (1997)

“Throughout the social sciences today, the dominant form of modeling is based upon the rational-choice paradigm. Game theory, in particular, is typically based upon the assumption of rational choice. In my view, the reason for the dominance of the rational-choice approach is not that scholars think it is realistic. Nor is game theory used solely because it offers good advice to a decision maker, because its unrealistic assumptions undermine much of its value as a basis for advice.”

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Robert Axelrod livro The Complexity of Cooperation

Introduction
The Complexity of Cooperation (1997)

“The advice takes the form of four simple suggestions for how to do well in a durable iterated Prisoner's Dilemma:1. Don't be envious.
2. Don't be the first to defect.
3. Reciprocate both cooperation and defection.
4. Don't be too clever.”

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Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 6 : How to Choose Effectively
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“Just as important as getting cooperation started were the conditions that allowed it to be sustainable. The strategies that could sustain mutual cooperation were the ones which were provocable.”

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Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 4 : The Live-and-Let-Live System in World War I
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“Change the payoffs.”

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Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

A common reaction of someone caught in a Prisoner's Dilemma is that "there ought to be a law against this sort of thing."

In fact, getting out of Prisoner's Dilemmas is one of the primary functions of government: to make sure that when individuals do not have private incentives to cooperate, they will be required to do the socially useful thing anyway. Laws are passed to cause people to pay their taxes, not to steal, and to honor contracts with strangers. Each of these activities could be regarded as a giant Prisoner's Dilemma game with many players.

Chap. 7 : How to Promote Cooperation
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“The live-and-let-live system that emerged in the bitter trench warfare of World War I demonstrates that friendship is hardly necessary for cooperation based upon reciprocity to get started. Under suitable circumstances, cooperation can develop even between antagonists.”

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Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 4 : The Live-and-Let-Live System in World War I
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“If a nice strategy cannot be invaded by a single individual, it cannot be invaded by any cluster of individuals either.”

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Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 7.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“The strategies which can invade ALL D in a cluster with the smallest value of p are those which are maximally discriminating, such as TIT FOR TAT.”

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Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 6.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“ALL D is always collectively stable.”

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Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 5.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“For a nice strategy to be collectively stable, it must be provoked by the very first defection of the other player.”

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Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 4.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“Any strategy which may be the first to cooperate can be collectively stable only when w is sufficiently large.”

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Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 3.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“TIT FOR TAT is collectively stable if and only if, w is large enough. This critical value of w is a function of the four payoff parameters, T; R, P, and S.”

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Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 2.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“If the discount parameter, w, is sufficiently high, there is no best strategy independent of the strategy used by the other player.”

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Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 1 : The Problem of Cooperation
Proposition 1.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)